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NOTES AND COMMENT
stupidity and clumsiness then surely one afflicted by disease should
not be penalized by the statute. The question to be asked in a case of
this kind has been tersely stated in a dissenting opinion by O'Brien,
J., in the Andrews case: 22 "Did the workman's employment require
him to be in the place, whether a floor or a walk or other structure,
which caused his injury." To us it seems that if this question is
answered in the affirmative the award should be allowed. This would
be interpreting the statute in accordance with its general purpose and
the policy intended.
In view of the authorities herein reviewed, it is difficult to
approve of the viewpoint taken by the majority of the New York
Court of Appeals in the Andrews case. The Court seems to have
entirely disregarded the spirit as well as the letter of the Workmen's
Compensation Law. On principle as well as on precedent, approval
of Andrews' claim would appear to have been a better holding.
RAYMOND C. WILLIAMS.
FORMATION OF A CORPORATION TO EVADE THE USURY LAWS.
Progressive courts and judges of the current day do much to
overcome the ill effect of the application of ancient common law rules
to modern-day conditions. They do more, and justifiably so, to over-
come the legislative lethargy in the matter of removing archaic and
anachronistic laws from the statute books. More than ever the
rationale of the recent decisions is found in the contemporary social
and economic concepts.
No better example of the incongruity of the rules of positive law
and the complex economic conditions of the day is found than in the
usury statutes.' It may well be conceded that such laws were splendid
pieces of paternal legislation and needed at the time of their enact-
ment. However, the increased complexity of commercial activities
and the interdependency of all people under the money economy of
the present day has rendered unnecessary, it seems, the need for con-
tinuing such paternal legislation. Certainly, today, the price of com-
mercial money is not controllable by such a simple instrument as a
rule of law. The changed relationship between supply and demand,
the effect of the monetary system, modern-day use of credit, and
other factors of the new economic order govern, and govern alone.
"-Supra Note 7 at 104.
'N. Y. Gen. Bus. Laws, sec. 370 et seq.: "The rate of interest upon the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action, except as other-
wise provided by law, shall be six dollars upon one hundred dollars, for one
year, and, at that rate, for a greater or less sum, or for a longer or shorter
time."
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Moreover, there is a growing tendency on the part of the people to
resent paternalistic legislation even when it is needful and effective.
The usury laws not only fail to accomplish their purpose of
checking the alleged unquenchable avarice of money lenders, but
render it difficult to obtain commercial loans.
"Conceded almost unanimously by economists to be in-
operative in controlling the price of commercial money, such
statutes have succeeded only in accentuating, in the field of
consumptive borrowing, the evils at which they were primarily
directed. Laudably intent upon protecting the necessitous bor-
rower from the mercy of the money lender, the Legislature
fixed rates of interest so prohibitively low as to drive the
entire business outside the law. The money lenders flourished
upon rates notoriously extortionate, while the borrower, un-
able to obtain help at legal interest, was reduced to seek it else-
where at a price which included the insurance of his lender
against the risks incident to violating the very law which had
been passed for the borrower's protection." 2
As early as 1850, not many years after the original usury laws
were enacted, the Legislature, as if a bit doubtful of their wisdom,
effected a partial repeal by an amendment forbidding corporations
the right to set up the defense of usury.3 The alleged purpose of
making the exception to the general rule was to render it easier for
corporations to obtain money.4 The purpose of the amendment in
itself was an admission that usury laws are not economically sound,
in that they make it difficult to borrow money and, consequently, tend
to stifle commercial activities.
In a recent case decided this year, 5 the Court of Appeals has seen
fit to extend the benefits of the exception intended for corporations
to an individual. The plaintiff in this case, now seeking to invalidate
a loan on the ground that it is usurious, was anxious to obtain money
in order to meet pressing obligations in connection with a parcel of
real estate that he owned. So anxious was he that he agreed to pay a
premium for the loan in excess of the lawful rate of interest as fixed
by the statute. However, the prospective lender, in order to protect
himself against the very action which the plaintiff was now taking,
refused to make the loan to the plaintiff individually, but agreed to
make the loan to a corporation, to be formed by the plaintiff. In con-
(1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 689.
'N. Y. Ben. Bus. Laws, sec. 374: "No corporation shall hereafter interpose
the defense of usury in any action. The term corporation, as used in this sec-
tion, shall be construed to include all associations, and joint stock companies
having any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by
individuals or partnerships.
'Rosa v. Butterfield, 33 N. Y. 674 (1865).
'Jenkins v. Moyse, 254'N. Y. 319 (1930).
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formity with the proposition of the lender, a corporation was formed,
the real estate transferred to it, and the loan made to the corporation,
the evidence of the debt being executed in the corporate name under
the hand of the plaintiff as president. In setting up the plea of usury,
the contention of the plaintiff was that "the corporate veil should be
pierced" and the loan regarded as made to him individually and,
therefore, usurious. In answer to this contention the Court said:
"The corporate entity may be disregarded where it is used
as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality. For that there is
ample authority. Here the corporate entity has been created
because the statute permits a corporate entity to make a con-
tract which would be illegal if made by an individual. The
law has not been evaded but has been followed meticulously in
order to accomplish a result which all parties desire and which
the law does not forbid." 6
That the usury law has been avoided though not evaded is the
essence of the holding of the Court. A nice distinction is to be made not
only in the law of taxation 7 but in other branches of the law, as well,
between avoidance and evasion. If the use of a corporate entity pal-
pably works an injustice, the courts are quick to term it an evasion.8
Such an example is found in the attempt of contractors to limit the
liability for personal injuries suffered by workmen on a dangerous
job, by setting up a separate corporation with limited resources for
the job.9 On the other hand, there is no judicial condemnation of the
use of the corporate entity so as to limit a merchant's liability for
debts incurred in a commercial undertaking, in the absence of extenu-
ating circumstances. However, the limitation of liability afforded
through the corporate entity is in itself avoidence of liability. Between
these two extremes there are many border-line cases and the decision
as to whether the adoption of the corporate form of doing business
leads to an evasion or an avoidance is determined by the social conse-
quences of the particular act under consideration.
Since the consequence of circumscribing the effect of the usury
law works no harm to society as a whole, it being the consensus of
opinion that the application of the usury law works the harm, and
both parties having mutually agreed to the circumscription, there is
little wonder that the Court in the recent case refused to "pierce the
corporate veil." Employment of the corporate entity and thereby
'Ibid. at 324.
'See Bowen v. New York Trust Co., 9 F. (2nd) 548 (C. C. A.. 2nd,
1925); see also U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506 (U. S., 1873) and other
cases cited in Footnote 36, (1929) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 14.
8 Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N. Y. Supp. 812 (lst
Dept., 1918).
'Summo v. Snare & Triest Co., 166 App. Div. 425, 152 N. Y. Supp. 29
(2nd Dept., 1915).
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"meticulously following the law" was the effectuation of a progressive
court's disposition to temper archaic legislative enactments.
As a practical matter, if one does seek to evade the usury laws,
he must be careful to meticulously follow the law in that the loan
must, in effect, be made to a corporation and not to an individual. 10
"The first thing the court will look at is whether the con-
tract was made by the corporation in its own capacity, for its
own benefit, or whether made by an individual in his own
capacity, and for his own benefit." 11
Since it is the duty of courts to interpret the law and not to make
it, they cannot and will not directly antagonize legislative edicts.
Consequently, in seeking to avoid the usury law, one must be careful
to bring the transaction within the narrow confines of the exception
permitted, or else the court has no means through which it can effec-
tuate its progressive attitude toward the cumbersome and useless rule
of the positive law.
Though the result of the decision in the instant case is just and
commendable from a social utilitarian viewpoint, one cannot but feel
that the decision has a bad effect in that it permits a perversion of the
purpose for which corporations should normally be formed. It is
difficult to justify the use of the legal fiction of a corporate entity
solely for the purpose of avoiding the law. The corporate idea was
not conceived, and ordinarily is not practiced, to attain this end, but
owes its existence to worthier and more substantial objectives. The
fact that a high court will endorse the use of a corporation simply to
avoid the effect of a harmful law is proof enough that that law should
be repealed. The usury laws have been repealed in many states and
in England. In our own state a partial repeal has been effected
through the enactment of special banking laws 12 relaxing the provi-
sions of the usury law so as to allow a moderate increase of interest
upon small loans. Effective small loan laws cover the needs of the
small borrower and it would seem that those laws should measure the
extent to which the legislative action need go in this modern day.
FRANCES MASLOW.
"Supra Note 5 at 324; Beckwith Agency v. Herald Publishing Co., 214
App. Div. 212, 212 N. Y. Supp. 108 (1st Dept., 1925); First Nat'l Bank v.
American Sea Line, 119 Misc. 650, 197 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1922); Fort v. 415
Central Park West Corporation, 131 Misc. 774, 227 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1928).
" Moltke-Hintfeldt v. Garner & Co., 145 App. Div. 766, 130 N. Y. Supp.
558 (1st Dept., 1911).
12 N. Y. Banking Law, sec. 345.
